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Ever since the United States Supreme Court shocked the nation with its
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,' the greatest judicial intrusion into
policymaking since its obstruction of New Deal legislation in the early 1930s,
constitutional scholars have been trying to understand-and implicitly to
prescribe-the appropriate role of judicial review in a democratic political
system. From the beginning there were those who insisted that the Justices
should restrict themselves to overturning only the most palpable violations of
the written fundamental law.2 But most analysts, more sympathetic to judicial
activism, tried to find a principled basis for that activism-something that
would permit its continuation but would restrain Justices from simply impos-
ing their personal social values on the country in the fashion of a super-
legislature.3 However, as the Warren Court's activism spilled into ever more
areas, as it more and more readily found that long-existing legal procedures
violated basic constitutional norms, as it more often imposed positive duties
upon public officials rather than merely negating unconstitutional behavior,
the problem of reconciling judicial review with democratic policymaking
became the major focus of attention.4 The Burger Court's curious blend of
activism and restraint, which looks ever more like the mere reflection of the
varying social values of its Justices, seems to have exacerbated the problem.
For the past few years the scholarly debate over the proper role of the judi-
ciary in a democracy has reached its greatest intensity since the 1930s.5
Both John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust and Jesse H. Choper's
Judicial Review and the National Political Process address this problem.
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Both urge limitations on the judicial role and broader reliance on the democra-
tic process to protect "rights" (the reason for the quotation marks will
become clear below, I hope). But despite these similarities, it is hard to
imagine two more disparate prescriptions for how to do it.
Professor Choper argues that judicial review should be limited to three
areas: 1) protection of those individual rights the Constitution puts beyond
infringement by any branch of any level of government; 2) protection of
national jurisdiction against state encroachments; 3) protection of judicial
authority against usurpation or limitation by either other branch of the
national government. The two other traditional areas of judicial activity-
protection of state rights from national government encroachment and protec-
tion of the jurisdiction of the executive and legislative branches of the national
government, each against the other-should be eliminated, he insists.
For Choper, the key determinant of whether the judiciary should review
the constitutionality of any category of government activity is the effective-
ness of the political process in protecting rights when the relevant decisions
were made. The states .and both the legislative and executive branches of the
national government have ample power to protect their rights within the poli-
tical system, he argues; minorities and the national judiciary do not.
Although Choper clearly is concerned with the relation of judicial review
to democracy, in his prescription he cheerfully ignores the usual contours of
the debate over the judicial role, both activism versus restraint and what Ely
calls "interpretivism versus noninterpretivism." (Ely defines "interpre-
tivism" to be the conviction that judges may enforce only those constitutional
requirements that are fairly drawn from the text of the Constitution itself.
"Noninterpretivism" permits judges to range beyond the words of the Cons-
titution to apply fundamental values imputed to such open-ended constitu-
tional provisions as the due process of law or cruel and unusual punishment
clauses.6) Those who complain of judicial infringement upon democracy
generally complain that the Justices impose their own values under the
pretense of enforcing constitutional limitations. None that I know of before
Professor Choper has suggested that the Supreme Court stop enforcing clear
constitutional mandates simply because the parties involved ought to be able
to protect themselves through the normal political process. Usually this is the
test that those who urge judicial restraint suggest when the constitutional
mandate is unclear.7 In fact, judicial acceptance of Professor Choper's pro-
posals would amount to the most revolutionary change in patterns of Ameri-
can government ever to have been imposed by the Court. For the Supreme
Court to reverse a century-long tradition of judicial function that has been
6. J. ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ELY].
7. Id.; A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 29-30 (1975); Freund, Mr. Justice Blach and the
Judicial Function, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 467 (1%7); Yarbrough, Justices Black and Douglas: The Judicial
Function and the Scope of Constitutional Liberties. 1973 DUKE L.J. 441, 451-52; Rehnquist, Obsercatio.-The
Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976); Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977).
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acquiesced in by the other branches of government and presumably by the
people who elect them would be "noninterpretivism" on a grand scale-not
only a reading of judges' values into constitutional texts where they may not
belong, but a refusal to apply the plain words of the Constitution itself.
Professor Ely's work falls into the more traditional framework. Ely has
no quarrel with judicial enforcement of clear constitutional mandates. In fact,
when the text of the Constitution clearly imposes limits upon government he
favors active judicial enforcement of them, demonstrating the truth of his
assertion that "interpretivism" and judicial restraint are not synonymous.8
He may not be satisfied that enforcing the constitutionally enshrined will of
generations long dead comports very well with true democracy, 9 but at least
the discretion of judges is limited to a source of substantive values other than
their own personal feelings. It is not too likely that Professor Ely will find
much positive to say about Professor Choper's proposal to provide judges
with a carte blanche when the funds of clear constitutional mandates upon
which to draw are most scarce and to close the account when the funds are
most plentiful.
Professor Ely urges full enforcement of constitutional provisions mandat-
ing clear constitutional imperatives. But he also urges judges to adopt what he
calls a non-clause-bound interpretivism. That is, when the Constitution seems
to require the protection of rights not clearly defined in the text itself, as in the
due process clause, judges must range beyond the document. In an incisive
criticism of the traditional process by which jurisprudents seek to define
fundamental rights, however, Ely insists all efforts to do so are suspect. There
simply is not a principled way to determine what rights are inherently funda-
mental; all efforts turn out to require judges to impose their own individual
preferences. Therefore, when the language of the Constitution itself seems to
require judges to go beyond the words of the document, Ely urges judges to
interpret this in a way that reinforces the democratic spirit of the Constitution
and American government. The elastic clauses of the Constitution should be
interpreted as a mandate to open the political process to all groups.
Ely recognizes, however, that the mere fact that minorities may partici-
pate in the political process is not itself a guarantee against unfair discrimina-
tion. When minorities are so isolated and unpopular that they cannot forge
with other groups the sort of alliances that underlie the give-and-take of
American politics, the technical right of political participation cannot protect
their rights. To Ely, the primary question is whether government acts that
work to the disadvantage of minorities work to the disadvantage of more
powerful segments of society in the same way. If they do not, he argues, the
judiciary should scrutinize them carefully. If they do, judges should not void
them unless they can fairly be held to violate a well-defined constitutional
8. ELY, supra note 6. at n.I.
9. Id. at 11-12.
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provision. This Ely calls a "participation-oriented, representation-reinforc-
ing" approach to judicial review.' °
Ely never makes explicit what the effect of his approach would be on
present constitutional doctrines. But logic and hints scattered through his
treatise suggest it would expand rather than contract the judicial role.
Although Professor Ely does not make very clear just which clauses of the
Constitution would be brought into play by specific elements of his theory,
the logic of his argument suggests that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment would give the Court the same latitude that it now has to
monitor police and legal procedures; the privileges and immunities clause
would provide authority to see to it that the political process remains open,
guarantee free speech, press, open legislative proceedings, and the like; and
the equal protection clause would authorize the courts to equalize the political
process la Baker v. Carr" and to scrutinize those actions that seem to affect
isolated minorities negatively without similarly affecting the rest of society.
(Despite early allusion to the open-ended quality of the ninth amendment, it is
not clear when Ely would have it come into play.) Although some present
judicially imposed restrictions on states-such as those in the first amend-
ment's religion clauses-could not be enforced directly under Ely's formula-
tion, government acts that worked to the disadvantage of religious minorities
without affecting other sects and denominations in the same way would come
under scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Government intrusions into
other areas that the Court has held off-limits in recent years-most notably
the "privacy rights" protected in Griswold v. Connecticut 2 and Roe v.
Wade 3 and the freedom of the press rights involved in pornography cases-
presumably would no longer be subject to judicial review unless they some-
how discriminated against isolated minorities.1
4
As a legal and constitutional historian, I feel a bit reluctant to jump into
the philosophical debate these books are bound to stiihulate on the nature of
constitutionalism and the role of judicial review in a democratic society. I
think that may safely be left to my colleagues in this Symposium. I am struck,
however, by how both Professor Ely's and Professor Choper's conception of
rights fits in with what historians perceive to have been the fundamental
theme of American development over the past century-what has been called
"the organizational synthesis."'' 5 This understanding of American history
posits that changes in the American economic system between the Civil War
10. Id. at 87.
II. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. ELY. supra note 6, at 164-70.
15. See S. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM, 1885-1914 (1957); R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR
ORDER, 1877-1914 (197): Cuff, American Historians and the 'Organizational Factor.' 4 CANADIAN REV. OF
AM. STUD. 19 (1973); Golambos, The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History, 44
BUS. HIST. REV. 279 (1970).
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and the New Deal led to so complex a society, with so many centers of
immense private power, that individuals no longer could cope with it as
individuals. Therefore, people with similar interests organized in order to
compete more successfully. This took place in all areas of American life-
business, labor, agriculture, the professions, academia, and others. The
Progressive and New Deal eras witnessed the adjustment of government to
the new social and economic organization, with the establishment of policy-
making and administrative machinery geared to servicing organized interest
groups and providing a forum for them to battle over policy and negotiate
compromise. This created what historians have called "the broker state," 
16
so responsive to organized interest groups rather than electoral pressure that
it has fostered the development of special interest groups in almost every area
in which government might have an impact; for example, among exponents of
equal rights for various minorities, equal treatment for women, benefits for
the elderly, among environmentalists, welfare recipients, and even among
those simply engaged in the "Common Cause." Government through the
"broker state" implies that policy decisions are made through conflict and
negotiation among groups with varying interests. The rights of individuals,
separate from their identification with one group or another, are anomalous in
this system. Perhaps that is why their protection has more and more been
delegated to the judiciary.
Professor Ely raises this understanding to a constitutional principle. For
him, the central value of the American political system is representation in the
process by which decisions are made. If there is any fundamental right
implicit in American government, it is this right to participate in it effectively.
His "representation-reinforcing" mode of constitutional review is designed to
open the process to all groups and to provide close scrutiny of government
action only when the system seems to have failed. Throughout his treatise he
analyzes government action in terms of its effect on minority groups, never
individuals. In Professor Ely's construct, individual rights hardly have a
place. So long as all groups are equally denied nonpolitical rights (and appar-
ently so long as the actual enforcement procedure comports with "due proc-
ess"), the judiciary must sustain the deprivation.
On the surface, Professor Choper seems more sensitive to the notion of
individual rights. His first proposition is what he calls his "Individual Rights
Proposal"-that the fundamental duty of the Supreme Court be to protect
those rights that individuals have against any government action. Nonethe-
less, he too seems most comfortable when he assesses those rights in terms of
"suspect classifications" of people subject to government sanctions, a notion
16. See G. MCCONNELL. PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966); T. LOWI. THE END OF
LIBERALISM (1969); Hawley. The New Deal and Business. in THE NEW DEAL: THE NATIONAL LEVEL 50
(Braeman ed. 1975): Chandler & Golambos. The Development of Large-Scale Economic Organizations in
Modern America, 30 J. ECON. HIST. 201 (1970); Hawley, The Discovery arid Study of Corporate Liberalism, 52
BUS. HIST. REV. 309 (1978).
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similar to Professor Ely's. 7 More important for understanding the limitations
in Professor Choper's conception of rights are his justifications for dropping
judicial review of cases involving state rights and separation of powers
between the executive and legislative branches of the national government.
Those justifications suggest a confusion between rights and interests that
undermines his Individual Rights Proposal.
Professor Choper provides three main justifications for his "Federalism
Proposal" to end judicial protection of state rights against national encroach-
ment. First, he points out that the trend of judicial decisions since the New
Deal has been to sustain national power anyway. But more important,
Professor Choper insists, state interests are adequately-more than
adequately, he hints-protected in national forums by the ordinary democra-
tic process. And finally he argues that disputes over which level of govern-
ment has the authority to affect individuals' interests are of far less impor-
tance than those in which individuals challenge the right of any level of
government to take the offending action; the former simply should not deflect
the courts from their primary duty of adjudging the latter.
For a historian, the fallacy of the first justification is patent. It presumes
that a trend which lasted since the 1930s will continue forever. History shows
that such reliance on the recent past to predict the long-term future is mis-
placed. Judicial interpretation of the federal system has always been subject
to ebb and flow. The nationalism of the Marshall Court was followed by the
dual federalism of the Taney, Waite, and Fuller Courts; 8 the nationalistic
Court of the Progressive era was followed by a Court, less committed to
expansive national power, that emasculated the legislation of the early New
Deal;' 9 and the intensely nationalistic post-New Deal Court may now be
giving way to one with a renewed concern for state jurisdiction. 20 The gradual
trend towards nationalism reflected the fact that society changed from 1789 to
17. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 70-79 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as CHOPER].
18. See E. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS (1936); F. FRANKFURTER, THE
COMMERCE POWER UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE (1937); A. KELLY & W. HARBISON. THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 257-83, 322-32 (5th ed. 1976); Benedict,
Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. Cr. REV. 39.
19. See A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOP-
MENT 522-79, 649-55, 697-709 (5th ed. 1976); A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT To WARREN
57-60, 88-99 (1958); P. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1915-1967 18-21, 46-47, 50-54,
128-51 (1972).
20. See Stem, The Commerce Clause anrd the National Econony, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 883
(1946); A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 109-16 (1958); P. MURPHY, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1915-1917 153-69 (1972); C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A
STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947 (1948); Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism. 36
VA. L. REV. 1 (1950). For signs of renewed concern for protection of state jurisdiction, see Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (197 1), and its progeny, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), and Juidice v. Vail. 430 U.S.
327 (1977), which stress the duty of federal courts to abstain from interfering with state judicial opinions until
they have run their course. At the same time the Court has been more reluctant than in the past to impose federal
court procedures and standards upon state courts. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Apadoca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972). In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court implicitly has revived
some of the principles of classic "dual federalism." Compare it to Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 113
(1870).
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the 1930s as local institutions became national. It is too much to presume that
this shift is irreversible. Changes in technology may make for growth in
localism. A conviction that national decisions unfairly jeopardize the rights of
local people may slowly work a change in our institutions. There are presently
growing complaints about national nuclear waste disposal policies that put the
entire burden upon one or two states, 2' the "sagebrush rebellion" of the
western mountain states,- western complaints about national wilderness
policy,2 and disputes over national permissiveness in off-shore oil explora-
tion." What if these concerns culminated in constitutional amendments
designed to limit national government action in these areas? Professor
Choper's Federalism Proposal would leave no sanction for such amendments,
effectively depriving Americans of a traditional mode of allocating govern-
ment powers in a manner beyond the power of Congress to alter. Such a
sanction is unnecessary, Professor Choper insists, because state rights are so
well protected in both Congress and the executive branch. But this illustrates
his confusion of rights with interests.
It is plain from Professor Choper's discussion of how securely "state
rights" are protected in the legislative process and in the executive adminis-
tration of the government that he really recognizes no state rights, but only
state interests. All of his examples of the way in which state "rights" are
protected in the political process relate to state authority in the aggregate. The
national government cannot take action unless the majority of representatives
from the states concur, Professor Choper points out. These representatives
are highly susceptible to pressure from state officials and special interest
groups. The minority is represented and has had ample opportunity to resist.
But this misconstrues the nature of a "right." The essence of a "right" is that
it provides an immunity against action whether or not you are represented in
the process that leads to its infringement. An interest may be weighed against
other interests in an appropriate forum. A right is what Ronald Dworkin calls
a "trump."25 It overrides all other interests, and it does not matter how small
the minority that possesses it. The fact that the interests of state constitu-
encies are carefully considered by congressmen in framing legislation will not
protect a single state from the decision of representatives of all the others, for
example, to use it as a nuclear dumping ground or to make a large part of it a
21. Carter, Nuclear Wastes, 200 SCIENCE 1135 (1978); Carter, Trouble Even in New Mexico for Nuclear
Waste Disposal, 199SCIENCE 1050 (1978); Jakimo & Bupp. Nuclear Waste Disposal: Not in My Backyard, TECH.
REV., March, 1978. at 64.
22. Beck & Reese, Sagebrush Revolt: Controversy Over Federal Land Ownership, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17,
1979, at 38.
23. Fineberg. The Alaska Land Question: Anger on the Last Frontier, 228 NATION 456 (1979);
Schiefelbein. Alaska: The Great Land War, SATURDAY REV., Feb. 17, 1979, at 14; Shaine, Alaska Land: A
National Issue, CURRENT, April, 1978, at 3; Alaska Lands Controversy, 57 CONG. DIG. 289 (1978).
24. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1976, at 40 col. 1; Approving the Sale of1.25 Million Acres of Oil Leases Near the
Channel Islands, NAT. PARKS AND CONSERVATION. Jan., 1976, at 25.
25. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1976).
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national park for the benefit of the rest of us. Of course, as the Constitution
now stands the interstate commerce power and the national government's
power to dispose of its own property gives Congress ample power to do both.
But if the Constitution were amended to limit that power, it is hard to see how
mere representation in Congress would vitiate a state's right to be exempt
from such an imposition.
Moreover, I think Professor Choper's differentiation between "state
rights" and "individual rights" will not bear close scrutiny. "State rights" are
far more than those the state has in its corporate capacity. By limiting the
national government to certain areas of jurisdiction the Framers gave indi-
vidual Americans an important right: to have certain decisions that affect
them made in a forum in which the interests to be weighed and the relative
power of interested parties would be different than in the national forum. The
consequences can be crucial in the most practical way. Few will need to be
reminded of the practical consequences for southern blacks of leaving ques-
tions of racial equality to be decided in state legislatures rather than the
national Congress. Legislation to regulate child labor, hopelessly stalled in
southern state legislatures during the Progressive era, sailed through
Congress once the decision was made on the merits rather than the constitu-
tional question of state rights.26 I trust few Ohioans will challenge me if I
suggest that efforts to restrict the burning of high-sulfur coal would find a
different reception on the floor of the Ohio state legislature than they have in
the national legislature.
Now, if one believes that judges should be protecting some set of human
rights inherent in natural law, most of the freedoms enumerated in the Bill of
Rights are likelier candidates for such enforcement than the right to have the
state legislature rather than Congress decide some aspect of public policy. But
if one believes that Americans' rights are defined by their written Constitu-
tion-a notion which even the most dedicated judicial activists concede27-
then I do not see how the right to have decisions made in the forum designated
by the Constitution can be converted into an interest to be brokered away by a
majority of the representatives in Congress.
The problem with Professor Choper's proposal that the judiciary refuse
to decide separation of powers cases is identical. The separation of powers
provided for in the Constitution guarantees individuals that certain kinds of
decisions will be made in certain forums. Once again that right has important
practical consequences. Professor Choper argues that because the owners of
26. E. DAVISON, CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION IN THE SOUTHERN TEXTILE STATES (1939); W.
TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND
CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 79-93, 98-105, 119-32 (1970).
27. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?. 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705 (1975). The Justices of
the American Supreme Court debated whether they could measure laws against "fundamental justice," rather
than against specific constitutional prohibitions, quite early in their career. See Calder v. Bull. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386 (1798). As Edward S. Corwin pointed out over 65 years ago, those who insisted that only constitutional
provisions could be enforced against legislative acts won the war of rhetoric. Their opponents won the war of
reality. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of.Amnerican Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REV. 247, 250 (1914).
[Vol. 42:69
TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS
the struck steel mills President Truman seized in 1952 were liable to having
them seized by a congressional law anyway, the Supreme Court should not
have considered whether Truman's acts exceeded his powers. No funda-
mental right of the mill owners was at stake, he insists. The Court ought only
to protect those individual rights secured against all government; if Congress
believed the President had usurped its authority, it had ample power to
protect its jurisdiction through legislation (or, presumably, impeachment) and
did not require the Court's solicitude.28 But is it true that no right of the mill
owners was infringed if Truman exceeded his constitutional authority? The
conservative Congress of 1950 was far more sympathetic to business interests
than the labor-beholden Truman. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the
mill owners could have averted takeover legislation in Congress far more
easily than they could forestall similar action by the President. If the Framers
of the Constitution designated Congress to be the forum in which such deci-
sions were made, then it seems plain that the owners had a right to have them
decided there, where the results were likely to have been different. The fact
that, according to Professor Choper, Congress could by various means have
forced Truman to rescind his order does not obviate the deprivation. As
Choper recognizes at other places,29 the balance of forces and institutional
structure of Congress make it much easier to obstruct action than to secure it.
Ultimately, Professor Choper's confusion of "rights" with "interests" in
the areas of federalism and separation of powers must undermine his proposal
to have the Supreme Court concentrate on defending individual liberties. For
if the ability of states to defend their interests in Congress justifies judicial
abstention from cases involving state rights, if the President's and Congress'
power to defend their interests each against the other justifies judicial
abstention in separation of powers cases, then it is hard to see how Choper
can resist Professor Ely's conclusion that the Court should abstain from
individual liberties cases when the parties have had similar opportunities
fairly to protect themselves in the decisionmaking process.
I find Professor Ely's outline of a "representation-reinforcing" mode of
judicial review far less subject to criticism of its logic. At the very least it
provides a consistent approach to enforcing the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause, something that it seems to me has eluded jurispru-
dents until now.3 And if one accepts Professor Ely's premise that "majori-
28. CHOPER, supra note 17, at 316-26 (in the light of 281-305).
29. Id. at 185.
30. It is simple to state the problem: since nearly all regulation classifies the population in some way,
subjecting some portion of it to rules not applicable to others, how can one enforce a rule requiring all persons to
be treated equally? The solution is harder to find. To require only that individuals in the same class be treated
equally negates the obvious intent of the requirement, since it would permit discrimination against black people,
for example, so long as all individual blacks were treated alike. This interpretation would permit discrimination
against the precise group the fourteenth amendment was designed to protect. On the other hand, nowhere does
the language of the amendment suggest that only racial categorization is prohibited by the equal protection
clause. So how does one decide what kinds of categorization are illicit? If one requires only that classifications
be "'reasonable," then judges must either abstain or usurp the legislative function, since it is legislators who
decide the reasonability of proposed legislation in our system. In recent years the solution has been to define
1981]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
tarian democracy is... the core of our entire system, ' ' 3 1 then his analysis of
the Bill of Rights, in which he interprets many of its provisions into "harbin-
ger[s] of the Equal Protection Clauses concerned with avoiding indefensible
inequities in treatment, ' 32 is compelling.
As I have already noted, Professor Ely does not clearly spell out just how
far he thinks his assessment ought to be taken. For example, he seems to
exempt "procedural" guarantees from his representation-reinforcement test.
Judges are to determine what process is due by weighing the social costs of
providing individuals with effective hearings.33 This approach leaves enough
latitude for judicial activism to have earned a trenchant rebuke from that
crusty opponent of "government by judiciary," Raoul Berger.34 But Professor
Ely's analysis could well be utilized by those more rigidly committed to judi-
cial restraint than he. The notion that so long as the democratic political
process is working properly, courts should not interfere with resulting sub-
stantive judgments militates against judicial review of the substance of laws in
any case in which reasonable men might disagree about their constitution-
ality.
But is the "core of our system," the fundamental American value,
democracy? To demonstrate that it is, Professor Ely turns to our historical
tradition and appeals to a present consensus, both of which he discounts in
other places as bases for discovering fundamental values,35 and to a close
reading of the language of the Constitution and its amendments, which is
persuasive primarily in light of his account of their history. I think that a brief
recapitulation of the origins of American commitment to democracy will
clarify its place in our hierarchy of values.
The heritage of the American democratic tradition can be traced as far
back as the great English constitutional crises of the seventeenth century and
even beyond, to the dimly perceived origins of the English conviction that
there were limits to what their kings could rightfully do. A leading scholar of
English constitutional thought in the 1400s has expressed this understanding:
The king has the right to command in his ordinances, his writs, his letters, and his
words, and his subjects ought to obey his commands, so long as they are not
incompatible with the true ends of kingship. He has the right to be provided with
sufficient material resources for the due discharge of that great and all-embracing
duty of pursuing Justice, but that right does not mean that he may take what is not
his own, for that would be to encroach on the right of others, which it is his duty to
protect; the rights of others may be encroached on only with their free
consent .... 36
certain classifications as -suspect" and therefore requiring more than mere "reasonability" to justify them.
But according to what consistent principle can "'suspect classifications" be defined? See ELY. supra note 6. at
145-56; Loewy, A Different and More Viable Theory of Equal Protection, 57 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1978); Note,
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
31. ELY, supra note 6. at 7.
32. Id. at 97.
33. Id. at 18-21.
34. Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation," 54 IND. L.J. 277 (1978).
35. Compare ELY, supra note 6, at 5-9, with 60-69 and 77-87.
36. S. CHRIMES, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 343 (1966).
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By the 1300s the king began to secure that consent by sending writs to the
sheriffs of the counties in England, instructing them to arrange the selection in
every county and in every town of representatives to a great "speaking," or
"parleying"--or "parliament." The king instructed in these writs that those
representatives "are to have full and sufficient power for themselves and their
respective communities to do and consent to those things which in our parlia-
ment shall be ordained .... By the 1300s it was agreed that consent to
taxation was essential. But those rights that could not be infringed without the
consent of the subjects were often held to mean more than the right to
property alone. Claims of this sort expanded and contracted in the course of
pre-seventeenth century English history. In the 1400s, a high-water mark of
limited-monarchy thinking in England, subjects were even conceived to have
a right in existing laws, so that they could not be changed except by the
consent of the people, given by representatives in Parliament. 8
Such broad claims contracted again during the reign of the Tudors in the
1500s, but the idea that the subject had liberties upon which the king could not
rightfully encroach without consent through representatives in Parliament
was held by all Englishmen when the first Stuart, James I, came to the throne
in 1603.39 From that year until 1688 there were a series of clashes between
Parliament and the Stuart kings, precipitated when members of Parliament
began to refuse to consent to the imposition of taxes unless the King modified
the policies adopted in administering the government. This the Stuarts
interpreted as an infringement on the royal prerogative, especially when the
policies in question involved religion, foreign policy, the choice of govern-
ment ministers, and the right of determining the line of succession to the
throne itself. To defend their authority the Stuarts tried to undermine Parlia-
ment's power over taxation, collecting levies without parliamentary consent
under various legal pretexts and at one point even accepting secret financial
support from England's arch-enemy, the King of France. Parliament in turn
perceived this and the Stuarts' pro-Spanish, pro-French foreign policies as
attacks on English liberty. The consequence was two revolutions. The first
was bloody and ultimately unsuccessful. The second was bloodless and a
success, driving King James II out of England, to be replaced at the invitation
of a "convention" of the people by William and Mary.4
37. Quoted in G. HASKINS. THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 6-7 (1948). By
the 1300s it was agreed that consent to taxation was essential. It was not yet believed that it could be secured
only in a parliament. Cf. G. SAYLES. THE KING'S PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND 90-91 (1974).
38. See S. CHRIMES. ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 59-61 (1966); G.
HASKINS, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 21-44, 57-62, 76-81 (1948); Hinton,
English Constitutional Doctrines from the Fifteenth Century to the Seventeenth, 75 ENG. HIST. REV. 410
(1960); Mcllwain, The English Common Law, Barrier Against Absohtism, 49 AM. HIST. REV. 23 (1943).
39. M. JUDSON. THE CRISIS OF THE CONSTITUTION: AN ESSAY ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL
THOUGHT IN ENGLAND. 1603-1645 34-43 (1949); J. KENYON, STUART ENGLAND 37-41 (1978).
40. See J. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 48-173 (1956); M.
JUDSON. THE CRISIS OF THE CONSTITUTION: AN ESSAY ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT
IN ENGLAND, 1603-1645 (1949); J. KENYON. STUART ENGLAND 13-267 (1978); B. LANDON, THE TRIUMPH
OF THE LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN ENGLISH POLITICS, 1678-1689 (1970); C. ROBERTS, THE GROWTH OF
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN STUART ENGLAND 48-173 (1966); J. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, 1603-1689 (1957).
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To justify this "Glorious Revolution," the "Whigs" who led it raised the
old English tradition that certain liberties could not be infringed without con-
sent to the level of natural right. John Locke articulated their principles in his
Second Treatise of Government.4' Before men join together in society, they
live in "a state of nature," in which no man has the right to deprive another
man of his "estate," Locke wrote. Men form societies and delegate to a
"Supreme Legislative" the right to govern them in order to better preserve
those estates. But the Supreme Legislative gains no right to deprive individual
members of the society of their property.
For it being but the joint power of every Member of Society given up to that
Person or Assembly which is Legislator, it can be no more than those persons had
in a State of Nature .... For no Body can transfer to another more power than he
has in himself.
42
Thus, "The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any Part of his
Property without his own consent." 43 If a government violated these restric-
tions, it would become a destroyer rather than a protector of peoples' estates,
thus dissolving the compact by which the society was formed. That would
return its members to a state of nature, in which they could form a new
society and vest the legislative power somewhere else. 44
The consequence of this great constitutional struggle was the emergence
of Parliament as the single most powerful institution of the English govern-
ment. The astute William and Mary and the Hanoverian monarchs who
succeeded them determined to rule through it rather than despite it. This they
did by making certain that their ministers could always command a majority
of the votes in the body.4 5 Possessed of such a majority, eighteenth century
English monarchs were tolerant of the exaltation of the place of Parliament in
English constitutional theory. Since Parliament was the institutional mech-
anism through which the English people consented to acts that othervise
would be infringements of their liberties, by definition there could be no
limitation upon the laws passed with its approval. By the time Blackstone
undertook his Commentaries on the Laws of England in the mid-1700s,
Englishmen recognized Parliament as the locus of ultimate legislative
sovereignty in their realm.46
Thus the English arrived at what we can recognize as a system of repre-
sentative government. But the motivating force had never been a commitment
41. J. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1698) (originally published 1690). For the relation of
Locke to Whig thought and Whig leaders, see P. LASLETr. JOHN LOCKE: TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
16-66 (1963); J. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 162-68 (1956).
42. J. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 135 (1698).
43. Id. at 138.
44. For the general discussion, see id. at 4-15, 77-142, 199-243.
45. The classic study of how they did this is L. NAMIER, THE STRUCTURE OF ENGLISH POLITICS ATTHE
ACCESSION OF GEORGE 111 (1929).
46. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765). See J. GOUGH. FUNDA-
MENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 188-91 (1956); C. MCILWAINE, CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND THE CHANGING WORLD 63-64 (1939).
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to democracy nor even to representative government itself. Parliament had
been committed to a single goal: preservation of liberty. The essence of that
liberty had been the requirement that the monarch secure consent for acts that
deprived subjects of "estates." Over the eighty-five years' struggle, the
opponents of "Stuart tyranny" had been driven to conclude that only through
self-government could liberty be preserved 7 The distance between this and
belief in democracy is manifest in the dismay with which the English gentry
who dominated Parliament contemplated the proposals of a handful of radical
Whigs and alienated Tories, who in the eighteenth century suggested that a
King-corrupted Parliament, in which whole cities were unrepresented and for
which only a tiny fraction of the people voted, could hardly give consent for
the entire people. These so-called Commonwealthmen urged that Parliament
be made truly representative by reforming the apportionment of seats, requir-
ing that members live in the districts they represented, holding frequent elec-
tions, and democratizing the franchise. 48 To these criticisms and propositions,
orthodox Whigs responded with the theory of "virtual representation." All
Englishmen, whether they voted or not, were represented in the English
Parliament, they insisted, because honorable and patriotic legislators care-
fully considered the welfare of the whole realm when they determined
policy.
49
Like all Englishmen, Americans inherited the belief that they could be
deprived of rights only by consent. Just as in England, that conviction had led
to representative government in the American colonies. But the heart of what
we call government by the consent of the governed remained protection of
subjects' "estates" from arbitrary (that is, nonconsensual) infringement.
Therefore, when Parliament in 1763 enacted the first element of what was
probably to be a systematic program of taxation, Americans perceived it to be
as much a violation of their fundamental rights as the Stuarts' effort to levy
taxes without parliamentary consent had been over a century earlier. No
dissertation on "virtual representation" could convince them that members
of Parliament in England could legitimately consent to infringement of
American liberties. "Virtual representation" made sense only if the actual
47. On the fundamentally conservative purposes of Parliament when the struggle began, see J. GOUGH,
FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 55 (1956); M. JUDSON, THE CRISIS OF THE
CONSTITUTION: AN ESSAY ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND, 1603-1645 17-
106 (1949); J. POCOCK. THE ANCIENT 'CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: ENGLISH HISTORICAL
THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 36-55 (1957).
48. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 34-54 (1967); C.
BONWICK. ENGLISH RADICALS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3-52 (1977); C. ROBBINS, THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN (1959). Pocock. Machiacelli, Harrington, and English Politi-
cal Ideologies in the Eighteenth Centur, 22 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 22 (1965).
49. B. BAILYN. THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 163-64 (1967). The con-
cept of "'virtual representation~ grew out of a long tradition of considering Parliament to be an almost mystical
representation of the whole realm rather than merely an aggregation of constituencies' representatives. See S.
CHRIMES. ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 131 (1966); M. JUDSON, THE
CRISIS OF THE CONSTITUTION: AN ESSAY ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND,
1603-1645 274-310 (1949). J. KENYON, STUART ENGLAND 35-36 (1978).
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representatives shared the interests, experiences, and attitudes of those who
had no voice in selecting them, and it was plain to Americans that no such
sympathy did or could exist.50 Throughout the conflict, in pamphlet, legisla-
tive debate, and resolution, Americans reiterated that basic theme: "The
supreme power cannot justly take from any man, any part of his property
without his consent, in person or by his Representative. ' ' 5
Professor Ely recognizes that controversy over representation played a
central role in precipitating the Revolution. But I think he is mistaken when he
writes that "input into the process by which they were governed" and frustra-
tion at unequal treatment were all there was to it.52 His argument that they
demanded representation because they believed that "justice and happiness
are best assured not by trying to define them for all time, but rather by
attending to the governmental processes by which their dimensions would be
specified over time" 53 strikes me as similarly off base. Both observations are
based on Professor Ely's definition of democracy as a process by which
governmental decisions are made. To him, therefore, the problem Americans
faced during the Revolution was to get rid of an inequity in the process (lack
of representation) that made decisions unfair. But that was not how the
American revolutionaries understood the representative element of their
English system of government. For them, the purpose of representation was
to protect liberty. And they understood full well what their specific rights
were. They were defined by the common law and detailed in the two great
documents of the seventeenth century English constitutional struggle: the
Petition of Right of 1628 and the Declaration of Rights of 1689. Representative
government was designed to protect those liberties from arbitrary infringe-
ment, not to replace them.54
Nonetheless, if the development of American constitutional theory had
gone no further than this conviction that consent was essential to legitimate
50. For the most important rebuttals, see Dulany, Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the
British Colonies... by Act of Parliament, in I PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 610 (Bailyn ed.
1965); Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the LegislativeAuthority ofthe British Parliament, in 2
THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 721-46 (McCloskey ed. 1967). See also C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE
REPUBLIC: THE ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF POLITICAL LIBERTY 333-35 (1953).
51. Boston Resolutions, November20, 1772, in 2 THE WRITINGS OFSAMUEL ADAMS 350,357 (Cushinged.
1904-1908). See, e.g., the Massachusetts Circular Letter of February 11, 1968, in I id. at 184; Resolutions of the
Stamp Act Congress, October 19, 1765, in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 457 (Niles
ed. 1822); Oration by Joseph Warren, March 5, 1772, in id. at 5; Oration by Benjamin Church, March 5, 1773, in id.
at 11; Philadelphia Resolutions, January 3, 1774, in id. at 170; Dickinson, Letters ofa Farmer in Pennsylvania, in
14 MEMOIRS OF THE HIST. SOC. OF PA. 277,318-20 and passim; Petition from the Assembly of Pennsylvania to
the King, March 9, 1771, in id. at45!; Resolutions ofthe Continental Congress, October 14, 1775, in IJOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 68-69 (Ford ed. 1904-1937); Hopkins, The Rights of the Colonies
Examined, in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-1776 41, 54-59 (Jenson ed. 1967); Hicks, The
Nature and Extent of Parliament's Power Considered, in id. at 164 166-69; Adams, A State of the Rights of the
Colonists, in id. 233, 239-42.
52. ELY, supra note 6, at 89.
53. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States ofAmerica, H. R. DOC. NO.
459, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
54. See C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC: THE ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF
POLITICAL LIBERTY (1953).
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government infringements of liberty, the appropriateness of Professor Ely's
"representation-reinforcing" mode of judicial review would be unchallenge-
able. Indeed, Americans' liberty-oriented political tradition would have been
shifted to the democracy-centered one Professor Ely describes. No matter
whether the ultimate purpose of representation is to protect liberty, so long as
the only sanction for the protection of rights is the power of representative
bodies to withhold consent to certain actions, the citizen's only practical right
is the right to be represented. Once that right to representation is conceded
and made effective, the citizen has no further claim upon the government.
Therefore, Theophilus Parsons could offer the following definition: "[Ploliti-
cal liberty is the right every man in the state has, to do whatever is not
prohibited by laws, to which he has given his consent." 55 But such a definition
is a prescription for legislative absolutism, with the single limitation that the
legislature cannot deprive the citizen of his voice in its own selection. Had
Americans pressed no farther along the road to constitutional liberty, there
would have been no need for Professor Ely to have prepared a treatise on the
role of judicial review, for it is hard to see how judicial review could have
developed under such a doctrine. And in fact, in the years following the
Revolution, it was commonly believed by Americans that their state legisla-
tures possessed sovereign power. The notion of "constitutionalism"-that
"fundamental" law was somehow distinct from ordinary legislative law-was
abroad in the land, but Americans were unable to assimilate it to their English
libertarian heritage, which posited that consent legitimated infringement of
liberty. 6
Even before the Revolution ended, however, many Americans concluded
that the right to representation alone was not enough to protect liberty. In the
face of economic depression, state legislatures began to respond to pressure
for laws that seemed to many Americans to protect the special interests of
some elements of the community at the expense of the rest. This in turn
caused a crisis in the accepted, consent-oriented doctrine of liberty. This
doctrine, men began to perceive, was based on the notion that the legislature
represented the people as a whole . They began to see that such an idea,
55. Quoted in id. at 408.
56. See D. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THEORY IN THE
EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 59-68 (1980). G. WOOD , THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC.
1776-1787 344-53 (1%9).
Bernard Bailyn argues that the concept of"constitutionalism- developed in America in the years preceding
the Revolution, B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 175-98 (1%7).
But I think he exaggerates how widespread an advanced understanding of the notion was. As most revolution-
aries conceived it. the idea that Britain was governed by a fundamental constitution was very limited in its
practical application. For most of them. the common law defined the "'ancient liberties" of English subjects.
These were part of a fundamental constitution that governed the realm. But this did not place them beyond the
powers of aty government institution to infringe. Rather, the revolutionaries constantly defined these "funda-
mental liberties" to be those that could not be infringed without their consent. It was Parliament's effort to do
that which violated the fundamental constitution of the realm. See the documents cited in note 51 supra. A
broader understanding of constitutional rights was implicit in the argument of the revolutionaries, see G. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. 1776-1787 259-91 (1969). but it was the wave of the future.
57. Cf. D. LUTZ. POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THEORY IN THE
EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 72 (1980).
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developed when Parliament represented all the people in consultation with a
king who was charged with the business of government, offered incomplete
protection for individuals' rights when the legislature itself did the governing.
It was too easy for the interests of a majority to be permanently separated
from those of the minority. In that case the majority could no more consent to
the infringement of the rights of the minority than Parliament could consent to
the infringement of the rights of Americans. The necessary identity of
interests, experiences, and attitudes were not present. The result was an
increasing demand that legislatures somehow be restricted from infringing on
certain rights at all.58
As men came to doubt that the mere requirement of consent would
protect rights against infringement, the application of the idea of "constitu-
tionalism" began to broaden. Through the 1770s most Americans believed
that the English constitution defined rights so fundamental that they could not
be infringed without consent. With consent no longer relevant, they began to
believe that rights must be beyond the power of any governmental institution
to infringe. Therefore, in the 1780s state courts began to refuse to enforce
laws that they believed infringed on rights.59 Although the Framers of the
American Constitution did not clearly proceed upon this premise in 1787-
1788, their arguments during the ratification controversy finally established a
secure theoretical foundation upon which judicial review could be built.
Basing their argument on the old connection between representation, con-
sent, and the power to infringe on rights, Anti-Federalists charged that the
remote national government would wield unlimited power because its presi-
dent and legislature represented the people rather than the states. Proponents
of the Constitution responded by arguing that sovereignty remained with the
people who established governments. Those governments received only such
power as the people delegated to them.60 The implications of this for judicial
review are plain: if authority to infringe on rights is not delegated, if in fact it
is specifically withheld by the terms of bills of rights incorporated into consti-
tutions, then the legislature exceeds its powers when it violates them. Such a
law is no law and the courts are bound not to enforce it. This is precisely the
argument John Marshall made in Marbuty v. Madison.61 Although Professor
Ely stresses the "relentless" expansion of democracy from 1789 to the
58. This discussion and that which follows is based on G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC. 1776-1787 (1969). See also D. LUTL, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG
POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 72-84, 118-24 (1980).
59. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. 1776-1787 453-63 (1969)- Corwin, The
Progress of Constitutional Theory between the Declaration of Independence and-the Meeting of the Philadel-
phia Convention, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 511 (1925). Several of these decisions proceeded upon the proposition that
courts ought not to enforce laws that violate natural rights, perhaps a different and vaguer group of rights than
those embodied in the British constitution. However, that is not critical to my argument. What is important is
that no matter what the origin of rights, judges were beginning to hold that mere representation in legislatures
was not enough to justify their infringement-that is, that consent through legislative representatives was no
longer a relevant criterion to judge the legitimacy of governmental action.
60. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 519-64 (1969).
61. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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present,62 one might just as well stress the "relentless" development of
judicial review. I think it would be difficult to determine which has prospered
more.
All this indicates that both representative democracy and judicial review
developed as means to secure a greater end-protection of rights. There is no
historical basis, therefore, for the worry that judicial protection of rights
somehow violates a deeper commitment to democracy. Professor Ely is cor-
rect in his contention that constitutional protections for rights developed out
of a concern that democracy (or, better, "representative government") might
not deal with all people equitably. But since the founding fathers did not
perceive "democracy" to be more important than "liberty," they did not
worry themselves into devising "representation-reinforcing" modes of
protection. They looked with favor on any institution that protected rights,
and whatever the rights that are protected by what Professor Ely calls the
"open-textured" or "open-ended" clauses of the Constitution,63 they are just
that-rights. They are not to be subjected to the give and take of the democra-
tic process. Each of us is justified in demanding that the rest of us honor our
obligation not to infringe them through government. Certainly our legisla-
tures, state and national, ought to try to define what those rights are and
refrain from depriving anyone of them. There may be reasons for believing
that judges are ill-equipped for making such determinations-reasons
grounded in legal philosophy or the realities of legal behavior as a political
scientist would describe them. But in light of our constitutional heritage, I do
not think a compelling argument can be made that democracy is so much more
central to our tradition than judicial review that judges should be constrained to
enforce laws they believe violate the rights implicit in those open-ended provi-
sions.
62. ELY. supra note 6. at 6-7.
63. Id. at 13. 14.
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